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AGENCY-MASTER AND SERVANT-IABILITY OF MASTER FOR INJURY TO INVITEE.-
The driver of the defendant's truck invited the fifteen-year old plaintiff to ride.
While the plaintiff was on the running board the truck struck a rut in the
street, causing him to fall. The plaintiff sued for the injuries sustained. Held,
that a nonsuit was proper. Zainpella v. Fitzhenry (I922, N. J. L.) 117 Atl. 711.
The court follows the orthodox view that the rule of respondeat superior does
not apply. Goldberg v. Borden's Milk Co. (1920) 227 N. Y. 465, 125 N. E. 8o7.
There is, however, a modern tendency to look upon the plaintiff as a trespasser
and then to inquire what duty is owed him as such. Kalmich v. White (1920)
95 Conn. 568, 111 Atl. 845; Hibbee v. Jackson. (1920) IOI Ohio St. 75, 128-N. E.
61. See (192o) 3o YALE LAW JOURNAL, 85; (921) 30 ibid. 758.
BILLS AND NoTEs-REEiPT OF MONEY FROM AN EMBEZZLER.-An officer of a
corporation converted some of its money and in due course of business paid
the same to the defendant bank for his personal debts. The defendant, ignorant
of the conversion, acted in good faith. The corporation became bankrupt, and
the receiver sued the bank. Held, (one judge dissenting) that the plaintiff could
recover. People's State Bank v. Kelley (1922, Ind.) 136 N. E. 30.
The case is lamentably out of line with the authorities. Merchants Loan &
T. Co. v. Lanson (1899) 90 Ill. App. I8; First Natl Bank v. Gibert (igog) 123
La. 846, 49 So. 593; 25 L. R. A. (N. s.) 631, note.
CITIZENS-PRESUMPTION OF Loss OF CITIZENSHnP BY NATURALIZED ALIEN-
REFUSAL OF PASSPORT BY STATE DEPARTMENT NOT CoxcLusm.-The Act of
March 2, 19o7 (34 Stat at L. 1228) provides that any naturalized citizen who
resides for two years in the foreign state from which he came shall be presumed
to have ceased to be an American citizen, unless he presents to a diplomatic or
consular officer satisfactory evidence to overcome the presumption. The plaintiff,
a naturalized citizen of German birth, owning property in Nebraska, returned
to Germany and remained there for over two years. At the outbreak of the
war he was refused a passport because he failed to present satisfactory evidence
to overcome the statutory presumption. Having succeeded in getting back to
the United States on an illegal passport in 1921, the plaintiff sued to recover
his property seized by the Alien Property Custodian. Held, that the action of
the State Department in refusing to issue a passport was not conclusive on
the court on the question of citizenship and that the plaintiff could recover.
Sinjen v. Miller (1922, D. Neb.) 281 Fed. 889.
The mere act of returning to the United States does not rebut the statutory
presumption of expatriation. United States, ex rel. Anderson, v. Howe (1916,
S. D. N. Y.) 231 Fed. 546; but see (IgIo) 28 Op. Att'y. Gen. 5o4. But the
absence of any affirmative renunciation of American citizenship and the continued
holding of property in this country were held sufficient in the instant case to
prove that the plaintiff did not intend to expatriate himself. For a discussion
of this subject, see Flournoy, Naturalization and Expatriation (1922) 31 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 702, 848.
CRIMINAL LAw-DISTINCTION BETWEEN ROBBERY AND EXTORTION-In accord-
ance with a plan conceived by the defendant, X's hotel room was visited by one
of the defendant's female confederates. By claiming to be the woman's husband
and by threatening X with a revolver, the male confederate obtained from X
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a sum of money. The defendant, having been convicted for aiding and abetting
a robbery, brought error on the ground that his offence, if any, was extortion.
Held, that there was no error. State v. Cast& (1922, Wash.) 207 Pac. 952.
This case seems sound since extortion is the corruptly demanding or receiving
for services money not due by law; :ind as a general rule can be committed only
by an officer under color of his office. 2 Bishop, New Criminal Law (8th ed.
1892) 225; Holt v. State (1912) 11 Ga. App. 34, 74 S. E. 56o; State v. Cooper
(igo8) i2o Tenn. 549, 113 S. W. 1O48; but see 2 Bishop, op. cit. 227.
CRIMINAL LAw-HYDRO-AEROPLANE NOT A FLOATING STRUcTURE.--A New York
statute made it a misdemeanor to operate on certain lakes a "boat, barge, vessel
or other floating structure" if "propelled . . . . by an engine operated by the
explosion of gas .'. .. without .... a muffler . . . ." N. Y. Laws, 1917, ch. 305,
sec. 15ooa. The relator, a pilot of a hydro-aeroplane, was convicted of violating
the statute, and appealed. Held, that a hydro-aeroplane was not a "floating
structure" within the meaning of the statute. New York, ex rel. Cushing v.
S111ith, (1922, Sup. Ct.) 119 Misc. 294. C
For the jurisdiction of admiralty over these amphibious "vessels," see (1922.)
31 YAIE LAW JOURNAL, 437.
DAMAGES-QUAsI-CoNTRAcT-EMPLOYEE'S REMEDIES UPON A WRONGFUL DIS-
cHARGE.-The defendant, having been engaged by a third party to clear certain
land, employed the plaintiff to help him. It was agreed that the defendant should
receive $3.5o per day as the work progressed and an additional sum at the rate
of $3.50 per day at the completion of the work, provided the enterprise proved
sufficiently profitable. It was further agreed that the net profit or loss should
be divided equally between the parties. The defendant wrongfully discharged
the plaintiff and finished the work alone, to his loss. The plaintiff, having been
paid but $3.50 per day, sued for an additional sum at the rate of $3.50 per day
as the reasonable value of his services. Held, that the action would not lie.
Bailey v. Furleigh (1922, Wash.) 208 Pac. 1091.
In labor cases reasonable value is not usually determined by the value of the
product of the labor to the defendant. San Francisco Bridge Co. v. Duinbartois
Land Co. (1897) 119 Calif. 272, 51 Pac. 335; Mooney v. York Iron Co. (189o)
82 Mich. 263, 46 N. W. 376. It is to be observed in the present case that the
plaintiff would have been subject to his half of the net loss if he had completely
performed the contract. It seems, however, that this defense should rnot be
available to a wrongful repudiator. Knotts v. Clark Construction Co. (1918)
161 C. C. A. 217, 249 Fed. 181; but see Wellston Coal Co. v. Franklin Paper Co.
(1897) 57 Ohio St. 182, 48 N. E. 888; Woodward, Quasi-Contracts (1913) 432,
note I.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-WIFE CANNOT SUE HUSBAND FOR NEGLIGENCE.-The
plaintiff, while riding with the defendant at his invitation, was injured by reason
of his negligent operation of the automobile. She brought this action to recover
damages for injuries sustained on that occasion. The action was commenced by
the service of a summons. Thereafter, and before the complaint was served, the
plaintiff married the defendant, a fact which was alleged in the complaint. Held,
that the complaint stated no cause of action. Newton v. Weber (1922, Sup. Ct.)
119 Misc. 240, 196 N. Y. Supp. 113.
Although neither spouse had a right of action at common law against the other
for a personal tort, many courts, through a liberal construction of the married
women's acts, permit such an action to be maintained. Prosser v. Prosser (igig)
114 S. C. 45, 102 S. E. 787; Cromwell v. Cromwell (192o) i8o N. C. 516, lO5
S. E. 206; contra, Woltumn v. Woltan (1922, Minn.) 189 N. W. io22; see
(1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 1081; (1920) 30 ibid. 188; Albertsworth, New
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Interests it the Law of Torts (1922) IO CALIF. L. REV. 461, 471. The New
York courts have consistently refused to allow the action. Perlman v. Brooklyn
City Ry. (1921, Sup. Ct) 117 Misc. 353, 191 N. Y. Supp. 891.
INJUNCTioNS-TRADE SECRErs-SoLcITATIoN OF CUSTOMERs.-After having
been employed by the plaintiff as a driver of his laundry wagon, the defendant
entered into business for himself and solicited the plaintiff's customers, a knowl-
edge of whom he had acquired in the course of employment. The plaintiff
sought to restrain the solicitation. Held, (one judge dissenting) that an injunc-
tion should not be granted. Fulton Laundry Co. v. Johnson (1922, Md.) 117
At. 753.
An employee will be restrained from either using or disclosing to others the
knowledge of trade secrets acquired in the course of his employment. Stevens
v. Stiles (19o9) 29 R. I. 399, 71 Atl. 802; Elaterite Paint Co. v. Frost (igoS) iO5
Minn. 239, 117 N. W. 388; Nims, Unfair Competition (igog) sec. 215. What
constitutes a trade secret is a question of fact. Ordinarily a knowledge of
customers is not considered peculiar or confidential information. Simms v.
Burnette (1908) 55 Fla. 702, 46 So. 9o; Stein v. Nat. Life Ass'n. (1899) 105
Ga. 821, 32 S. E. 615. In conformity .with this view the court in the principal
case refuses to consider as a trade secret a fact which was susceptible of dis-
covery by any third party. See (igi8) 28 YALE LAW J ORNAL, 838; COMMENTS
(1915) 25 ibid. 499.
INSURANCE-RECOvERy OF PREMiUm PAID.-In compliance with the National
Prohibition Act the plaintiff submitted with his application for a permit to sell"
liquor a surety bond furnished by the defendant, the plaintiff having paid the
premium thereon. After a delay the plaintiff's application was rejected. He
thereupon returned the bond to the defendant and demanded the return of the
premium. Held, that the plaintiff could recover. Lattarula v. National Surety
Co. (1922, Mun. Ct.) 196 N. Y. Supp. 98.
The general rule is that the premium must be returned if the risk was never
run. Tyrie v. Fletcher (777, K. B.) Cowp. 666. It has been qualified, however,
to the extent that the insured may not recover premiums paid if he intentionally
or fraudulently prevents the risk from attaching. Vance, Insurance (19o4) 246.
The instant case comes within the general rule and is clearly correct.
INTOXICATING LIQUoRS-FoRFEIURE OF AUTOMOBILE CARRYING LIQUOR.-A
truck used in the illegal transportation of liquor was seized, while in the posses-
sion of the applicant's son, by virtue of a statute providing that where liquors
are illegally transported, the vehicle may be seized, and unless good cause to
the contrary is shown by the owner, it may be sold at public auction. N. Y.
Laws, 1921, ch. 156. The applicant asked for the return of the truck on the
ground that he merely loaned it to his son, and had no information as to the
purpose for which it was being used. Held, that the owner could not recover.
Matter of Denemark (1922, Co. Ct) 118 Misc. 699, 195 N. Y. Supp. 232.
There is a conflict as to the interpretation of statutes of this type. Parting
with possession has been considered not to be "good cause" in some cases.
Bucholz v. Commonwealth (192o, Va.) i2 S. E. 760; Fearn v. State (1921, Ala.)
88 So. 591. Where there is no consent, fault, or knowledge on the part of
the owner, courts have been more liberal. State v. Johtson (1921, N. C.) io7
S. E. 433; Hoskins v. State (1921, Okla.) 2oo Pac. 168; see (1920) 30 YAI.E
LAw JoURNAL, 91; NoTEs (1920) 34 HARV. L. REv. 2oo; (ig2o) ig Micr L.
REv. 350. This case is in accord with the construction placed by the Supreme
Court on similar statutes. See Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States (192i)
254 U. S. 505, 41 Sup. Ct. 18g.
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LIMITATI6N OF ACTIONrs-AMENDMENTS RESTATING CAUSE OF AcTiN-CHANG-
ING FROM REMEDY UNDER FEDERAL ACT TO REMEDY UNDER STATE STATUTE.-The
plaintiff's intestate was killed while in the employ of the defendant railway. 
An
action was begun nine months later under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act but was withdrawn, and the plaintiff more than twenty-two months 
after
the death of the intestate amended the original complaint to comply 
with a
Virginia statute (Va. Code, I9O4, ch. 137, sec. 2903) giving a cause of action
for wrongful death, providing that such action was brought within 
twelve
months after the death. The defendant contended that this cause of action 
had
expired since the intestate had died more than twelve months prior to the 
filing
of the amendment. The plaintiff suffered a voluntary nonsuit, and eleven months
later filed a new complaint in the same language as the original complaint and
amendment. Held, (one judge dissenting) that the plaintiff could not recover.
Capps v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. (1922, N. C.) III S. E. 533.
The court held that the amendment alleged a new and independent cause 
of
action, and thus could not relate back to the date of the original petition. This
seems unnecessarily harsh on the litigant who is attempting to find the correct
remedy. It is usually considered the same cause of action where the amend-
ment is an amplification of the original complaint. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v.
Renn (1916) 241 U . 290, 36 Sup. Ct. 567; Laminars v. C. G. W. Ry. (1919)
187 Iowa, 1277, 175 N. W. 311; see (192o) 5 IowA L. BUL. 275. The instant
case can be justified by the provision of the Virginia statute that the time in
which an action is pending, after an abatement or dismissal, shall not be 
counted
as part of the period of twelve months. After suffering a nonsuit the plaintiff
still had three months in which to bring another action, since only nine months
of the statutory period had elapsed before the original action was brought. For
the effect of statutes of limitations on amendments changing the cause of 
action
from equity to law, se6 COMMENTS (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 1053; (1918)
27 ibid. 1084.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-PROBABLE CAUSE A QUESTION FOR THE JuRY-The
defendant instigated a criminal prosecution against the plaintiff for selling
obscene and indecent literature contrary to statute. N. Y. Cons. Laws, 
19o9,
ch. 40, sec. 1141. The plaintiff was acquitted, and sued for malicious prosecution.
The court left to the jury the question of whether the book was of such a
character as to justify a belief that its sale was in violation of the Penal Law.
Held, (two judges dissenting) that the question of probable cause was properly
left to the jury. Halsey v. The Society for the Suppression of Vice (I922) 234
N. Y. I, 136 N. E. 219.
Probable cause is generally defined as the existence of a state of facts and
circumstances sufficiently strong to induce the ordinary and reasonable man to
entertain a belief that the accused is guilty of the crime charged. Bowen v.
Pollard (1917) 173 N. C. I29, 91 S. E. 711. Logically this is a question for the
jury inasmuch as the standard adopted is that of the average reasonable man.
For reasons of policy, however, most courts regard it a question of law, 
or, more
accurately, a question of fact to be answered by the court. This view is adopted
to prevent prosecutors from being harassed because a jury would be prone to
find lack of probable cause after an acquittal. Ball v. Rawles (1892) 93 Calif.
222, 28 Pac. 937; Hess v. Oregon German Baking Co. (1897) 31 Or. 503, 49 Pac.
803. The decision in the instant case is opposed to the great weight of authority,
and seems objectionable on grounds of policy. For a discussion of this point
see COMMENTS (1916) 25 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 328; NOTES (1920) 20 Coi L.
REv. 897.
MUNICIPAL CORORATIONs-G0VERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS-COLLECTION OF GA-
BAGE.-The plaintiff was injured as a result of the negligent management of a city
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truck used in gathering garbage, and sued the city for damages. Held, that the
plaintiff could not recover. James v. City of Charlotte (1922, N. C.) 112 S. E. 423.
There is a diversity of opinion as to whether the collection of garbage and ashes
and the cleaning of streets is a governmelital or a corporate duty. 4 Dillon,
Municipal Corporations (5th ed. 1911) 2899; 6 McQuillan, Municipal Corpora-
tions (1913) 5436. In the following cases the municipality was held liable for
injuries resulting from the negligent performance of such duties. Missano v.
New York (1899) 16o N. Y. 123, 54 N. E. 744; Young v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co.
(1907) 126 Mo. App. I, 103 S. W. 135; contra, Haley v. Boston (19o6) 191 Mass.
291, 77 N. E. 888; Kuehn v. City of Milwaukee (1896) 92 Wis. 263, 65 N. W.
103O. The recent tendency is to broaden the liability. Fowler v. City of Cleve-
land (1919) IOO Ohio St. 158, 126 N. E. 72; COMMENTS (1920) 29 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 911; NOTES (1920) 34 HARV. L. REv. 66.
PROPERTY-ADVERSE PosSEssiON-DEFINITION OF ExCLUSIVENESS.-Although Ivy
Griffin and his father cultivated certain land and divided the crops title was claimed
by Ivy alone. After holding for the statutory period, Ivy granted the land to the
plaintiffs, his sons, who brought an action of trespass to try title against the
defendant, the record owner. Held, that the plaintiffs were entitled to the land.
Perry v. Griffin (1922, Tex. Civ. App.) 241 S. W. 252.
Possession, to be adverse, must be exclusive. Philbin v. Carr (I92O, Ind.)
129 N. E. 19; 2 Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 1920) 1929. The present case,
however, very properly qualifies this statement of the rule. It is essential that
the adverse possessor exclude all whose claims are equal or superior to his own.
O'Banion v. Simpson (192o) 44 Nev. 188, 191 Pac. 1O83; Strom v. Hancock Land
Co. (1914) 70 Or. ioi, 14o Pac. 458; Woodruff v. Langford (19o8, Iowa) 115
N. W. lo2O; Wyatt v. Elam (1857) 23 Ga. 2Ol; Ballantine Claim of Title in
Adverse Possession (1919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 219; (1922) 20 MIC. L. REv.
441; (1915) 13 ibid. 69o; (19o7) 20 HARV. L. REV. 410; (1896) io ibid. 251.
PROPERTY-FIXTURES-TESTS AS TO WHEN PERSONALTY ATTACHED TO LAND
BEcOmES REALTY.-The plaintiff and the defendant, as joint owners of land, for
a monthly rental permitted the erection by a corporation in which they were
both interested of a combined feAce and signboard, reserving the privilege of
removal. The defendant exchanged his interest in the land for the plaintiff's
interest in the corporation which erected the sign. The defendant later removed
the sign, and the plaintiff brought an action for its conversion. Held, that the
plaintiff could not recover. Breyfogle v. Tighe (1922, Calif. App.) 208 Pac.
ioo8.
Because of the rigid definition which some courts have placed upon "annexa-
tion," confusion has resulted in the law of fixtures. The better and more modern
view is to interpret annexation in the light of all the surrounding circumstances.
NOTES AND COMMENTS (1920) I8 MIcE. L. REv. 405; NOTES (1913) 13 COL. L.
REv. 247. The application of these standards varies with the relationship of the
parties. As to landlord and tenant, see (1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 930;
(1921) 5 MINN. L. REV: 395; (1921) 35 HARv. L. Rnv. 86. As to vendor and
vendee, see COMMENTS (1919) 7 CALIF. L. REV. 351; (1920) 30 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 307; (iig) 32 HARv. L. REv. 732. As to tenant and mortgagee, see
NOTES (1913) 61 U. PA. L. REV. 325. A chattel annexed to the land of another
by mistake may be considered personalty. (1918) 18 COL. L. Rev. 367. The
court in the instant case found that the parties intended the signboard to remain
personalty.
QUAsi-CoNTRAcT-REcoVERY OF MONEY PAID UNDER A MUTUAL MISTAKE OF
FACT-CHANGE OF POSITION AS A DEFENSE.-The plaintiff bought an automobile
from one Hughes, and paid a part of the purchase price to the defendant, who
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held a note against Hughes, secured by a chattel mortgage on the automobile.
Neither party knew that Hughes had stolen the automobile until after the def end-
ant had surrendered the note and released the mortgage. After the automobile
was returned to its true owner, the plaintiff sued to recover the money paid.
Held, that the plaintiff could not recover. Gaffner v. American Finance Co.
(1922, Wash.) 206 Pac. g16.
As between parties having equal equities, one of whom must suffer, the loss
should lie where it has fallen. Ex parte Richard & Thalheimer (1913) i8o Ala.
58o, 61 So. Sig; Atlantic Coast Line Ry. v. Schirner (igio) 87 S. C. 309, 69
S. E. 439; Walker v. Conant (1888) 69 Mich. 321, 37 N. W. 292; Woodward,
Quasi-Contracts (1913) 39; Keener, Quasi-Contracts (1893) 66; Costigan,
Change of Position as a Defense (1907) 2o HAv. L. Rav. 205, 216; (1893) 7
ibid. 241; (9o8) 8 COL. L. REv. 404.
SPECFIC PERFORMANCE-MUTUALITY-OIL LEAsEs.-In an action to obtain speci-
fic performance of an agreement to execute an oil lease, it appeared that the
lease placed the plaintiffs under a duty to start drilling for oil on the premises
within six months and to make certain small payments to the defendants. The
plaintiffs were also given the power and privilege to surrender the lease at any
time. Held, that the defendants could not be forced to execute the lease since it
lacked mutuality. Dabney v. Key (1922, Calif. App.) 207 Pac. 921.
The above type of lease, frequently used in oil and mineral development, is
usually held to lack mutuality and therefore not specifically enforceable. Advance
Oil Co. v. Hunt (1917) 66 Ind. App. 228, 1i6 N. E. 340; Watford Oil & Gas
Co. v. Shipman (1908) 233 Ill. 9, 84 N. E. 53; contra, Guffey v. Smith (1915)
237 U. S. 101, 35 Sup. Ct. 526, departing from Rutland Marble Co. v. Ripley
(I869, U. S.) 1O Wall. 339; see COMMENTS (1917) 27 YALE LAW JOuRNAt, 261;
Ames, Mutuality in Specific Performance (19o3) 3 COL. L. REv. I.
TORTs-NEGLGENcE-ATTRAcWivE NUlsANcE-The defendant had on his land
a poisonous pool of water. Its appearance was similar to a swimming pool, the
water being clear and appearing to be pure. Two children of the plaintiff,
eight and eleven years old, came on the defendant's land, went into the pool,
were poisoned and died. Held, (three judges dissenting) that, as the children
were trespassers, the plaintiff could not recover, since the pool did not constitute
an attractive nuisance. United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt (1922, U. S.) 42
Sup. Ct. 299.
This case is in accord with the tendency of the federal courts to limit the
doctrine of attractive nuisance to turn-tables and dangerous machinery only.
Erie R. R. v. Hilt (1917) 247 U. S. 97, 38 Sup. Ct. 435; Nat'l. Metal Edge Box
Co. v. Agostini (1919, C. C. A. 2d) 258 Fed. log; see (192i) ig MIcH L. REv.
450. Some courts have extended the doctrine to other situations, but few have
applied it to natural conditions, such as a pond or body of water. Swartz v.
Akron Waterworks Co. (1907) 77 Ohio St. 235, 83 N. E. 66; Thompson v. Ill.
Cent. Ry. (1913) 1O5 Miss. 636, 63 So. 185; contra, Kansas City v. Siese (1905)
71 Kan. 283, 8o Pac. 626. For variations in the extent of this doctrine, see
(1922) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 556; (1921) 31 ibid. 1O2; (1921) 30 ibid. 870.
TORTS-MALICIOUS PROSECUTION FOR ACTIONS NOT INVOLVING ARREST OR
SEIzURE-The defendant maliciously and without probable cause brought nine
successive suits against the plaintiff, all of which terminated unsuccessfully. The
defendant did not at any time cause the arrest of the plaintiff or seizure of his
goods. The plaintiff brought an action for malicious prosecution. Held, that
the plaintiff could recover. Shedd v. Patterson (1922, Ill.) 134 N. E. 705.
Some American courts adhere to the English rule that an action for malicious
prosecution cannot be maintained in the absence of arrest of person or seizure
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of property. Jerome v. Shaw (igi6) 172 N. C. 628, go S. E. 764; contra,
Peerson v. Asheraft Cotton Mills (1917) 2O Ala. 348, 78 So. 204. It has been
suggested that the element of seizure or arrest should not be decisive in the
presence of all the other required elements. (i918) 32 HARv. L. RaV. 85; (igi8)
16 MicH. L. RaV. 653. This view has found recent support. Teesdale v. Lieb-
schwager (1921) 44 S. D. 58, 182 N. W. 314; Peerson v. Ashcraft, supra; contra,
Jerome v. Shaw, supra; Pye v. Cardwell (ig2o, Tex. Civ. App.) 224 S. W. 542
(six successive suits). Illinois formerly refused an action in the absence of
arrest or seizure. Smith v. Mich. Buggy Co. (1898) 175 Ill. 61g, 5I N. E. 569.
It has limited this rule, however, to ordinary civil actions and has held that a
malicious and unfounded petition in bankruptcy was actionable, even though
proceedings were quashed before appointment of a receiver. Norin v. Scheldt
(1921) 297 Ill. 521, 13o N. E. 791. The instant case represents a strengthening
of the desirable tendency to restrict the rule denying relief. (1921) 30 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 310.
UNFAIR COMPETITION-USE OF THE TRADE-NAmE OF ANOTHER MAY BE
ENJOINED.-For over fifty years the plaintiff manufactured and sold a pepper-
sauce known as "Tobasco." The defendant used the word "Tobasco' to describe
a pepper-sauce made by him, and the plaintiff sought an injunction. Held, that
the use of "Tobasco" as the name of the sauce should be enjoined, but-that the
defendant was privileged to state that his sauce was made from Tobasco peppers.
Trappey v. Mcllhenny Co. (1922, C. C. A. 5th) 281 Fed. 23.
The use by one manufacturer of a name or a mark which misleads the public
into believing that an article manufactured by it is manufactured by another is
an actionable wrong. Salmond, Torts (5th ed. 1920) sec. 151. Thus a taxicab
company was enjoined from imitating a characteristic marking already in use.
American Yellow Taxi Operators v. Diamond (1922) 202 App. Div. 490, 195 N. Y.
Supp. 14o; (I92O) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 698. See Eagle Pencil Co. v. Baehr
(1922, Sup. Ct.) 118 Misc. 57I, 195 N. Y. Supp. 59; Goldin v. Clarion Photoplays
(1922) 202 App. Div. 1, 195 N. Y. Supp. 455; Royal Baking Powder Co. v.
Federal Trade Commission (1922, C. C. A. 2d) 281 Fed. 744. The law properly
protects ingenious devices and names from competitors. See COMMENTS (1921)
31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 93; (1920) 33 HARV. L. REv. 617; Haines, Efforts to
Define Unfair Competitimt (1919) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, I, 8.
WILLS-DESCENT AND DIsmmuToN-PREsumnpTION OF DEATH OF ABSENT
DEviSEE.-While the plaintiff was absent and unheard from for more than eight
years the estate of his father, under whose will he was a devisee, was settled,
and thereafter at the instance of another devisee, a partition was decreed. The
court found that the plaintiff was no longer living and consequently his estate
passed to the other devisees as his heirs at law, no provision being made for him
upon his return. The plaintiff sued to set aside the decree for fraud and want
of jurisdiction. Held, that his rights were not extinguished as against the
parties to the record who were chargeable with notice of his interests. Eddy v.
Eddy (1922) 302 Ill. 446, 134 N. E. 8oi.
The court reached this result on the analogy of cases dealing with a grant
of administration upon the estate of a person in fact living. ScOtt v. McNeal
(1894) 154 U. S. 34, 14 Sup. Ct. IIo8; cf. Blinn v. Nelson (igii) 222 U. S. I,
32 Sup. Ct. I. It has usually been held, however, that a decree of distribution,
containing a finding of death of a distributee, concludes the rights of all parties
unless an appeal is taken within the time limited by statute, or otherwise set
aside in some proper proceeding. Hurt v. Hurt (1853, S. C.) 6 Rich. Eq. 114.
In attacking the driginal decree the plaintiff in the instant case used the proper
method. For a discussion of the effectiveness of a judgment against claims of
a supposedly dead absentee, see COMMENTS (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 943.
